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Abstract 
 
In addition to conceiving of such imaginary scenarios as those involving philosophical zombies, we may 
conceive of such things being conceived. Call these higher order conceptions ‘meta-conceptions’. Sorensen 
(2006) holds that one can entertain a meta-conception without thereby conceiving of the embedded lower-
order conception. So it seems that I can meta-conceive possibilities which I cannot conceive. If this is 
correct, then meta-conceptions provide a counter-example to the claim that possibility entails 
conceivability. Moreover, some of Sorensen’s discussion suggests the following argument: if the 
conceivability of some proposition entails its possibility, then the meta-conceivability of some proposition 
entails its possibility; but we can meta-conceive impossibilities; so conceivability doesn’t entail possibility. 
In this paper, I’ll argue that one cannot entertain a meta-conception without thereby conceiving of the 
embedded lower-order conception. And so we can neither meta-conceive impossibilities nor meta-conceive 
possibilities of which we cannot thereby conceive.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Philosophy abounds with fanciful scenarios. Students encountering the subject for the 
first time are asked to consider waking to discover that they are unwittingly playing a 
crucial part in a critically ill violinist’s life support, counties where empty barn facades 
are not entirely uncommon, babies lying unattended on forked train tracks, and many 
more.  
 
In addition to conceiving of such things, we may conceive of such things being 
conceived. Indeed, we just did when we envisaged students considering the above 
examples of philosophical thought experiments. Let’s, following Roy Sorensen (2006), 
call these higher order conceptions ‘meta-conceptions’. Meta-conceptions play an 
important and understudied role in philosophical methodology. We appeal to such 
conceptions; and, in considering the responses, agreements and disagreements of our 
interlocuters, we conceive of these interlocuters entertaining our conceptions. But 
moreover, in reflecting on this very method of philosophy, we also employ meta- 
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conceptions. For we unavoidably conceive of conceptions being entertained in our 
discussion of the role of conception in philosophy. Meta-conceptions thus play a role in 
our discussion of philosophical methodology. For this reason, progress in our 
understanding of our own philosophical methods would be facilitated by a better 
appreciation of higher-order conceptions.  
 
In this paper, I will be primarily concerned with the role of meta-conceptions in what is 
arguably the central issue for modal epistemology, the question whether conceivability 
entails possibility. Many hold that being able to conceive of something does not generally 
entail that that thing is genuinely metaphysically possible. Sorensen offers a novel and 
important argument for this claim from consideration of higher-order conceptions. 
Sorensen’s arguably relies in part on the claim that we can meta-conceive impossibilities. 
In brief, the argument suggested by Sorensen’s discussion is as follows: if the 
conceivability of some proposition entails its possibility, then the meta-conceivability of 
some proposition entails its possibility. But we can metaconceive impossibilities. So 
conceivability doesn’t entail possibility.  
 
In this paper, I’ll claim that this argument is unsound. We cannot meta-conceive 
impossibilities. Or rather, I will argue that, for any sense of conception under which 
conceivability would guide possibility, we cannot conceive of impossibilities being 
conceived. If this is right, then there is a significant result for meta-philosophy or our 
understanding of philosophical methodology. The paper comes in three parts. I’ll begin 
by reconstructing Sorensen’s argument (§1). I’ll next discuss the relation holding 
between conceptions and meta-conceptions. In particular, I’ll argue that meta-
conceptions collapse into conceptions. That is to say, if I legitimately meta-conceive of 
something being conceived, then I thereby also conceive of that thing myself. Sorensen’s 
counterexamples, to the claim that meta-conceivability entails possibility, are all cases 
where alleged meta-conceptions fail to collapse. That is to say, they are cases where I can 
meta-conceive an impossibility but I cannot thereby conceive of that impossibility. 
Sorensen proposes a defense of his claim that meta-conceptions do not collapse into 
conceptions and, in this part of the paper, I’ll assess this defense (§2). Finally, I’ll argue 
that the relevant meta-conceptions for our issue indeed collapse into conceptions. Here 
I’ll note that not every imaginative act is a guide to possibility. Rather, there have been 
various proposed conditions that have been placed on an imaginative act so to be a 
legitimate possibility guiding conception. I’ll survey these proposals and conjecture that 
any legitimate condition placed on a lower order conception, in order that it be possibility 
guiding, ought to be place on higher order conceptions as well. So although meta-
conceptions do not generally collapse into first order conceptions, possibility guiding 
meta-conceptions do collapse into possibility guiding first order conceptions. Indeed, 
collapsability is a mark of possibility guidance (§3). There’s also a brief conclusion, 
where I draw a few consequences for our discussion of philosophical methodology.  
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1 
 
I’ll begin with the basic background issues in modal epistemology. In at least many cases, 
the philosophical methodology described in the first paragraph relies on the tacit 
assumption that the imagination can provide warrant for our modal beliefs. Call the 
principle, that the conceivability of some given proposition entails that the proposition is 
possible, the Entailment Thesis.  
 
The principle that conceivability entails possibility has received much attention in recent 
discussion of philosophical zombies, creatures physically and functionally identical to us 
but lacking phenomenologically rich experiences. Zombies act as though they experience 
pleasure and pain, but there’s nothing that pleasure or pain is like to them. If such 
creatures are conceivable, some philosophers of mind argue, then they are metaphysically 
possible and so our mental states are not identical with any physical state which realizes a 
mental state. For a discussion of philosophical zombies, see for example Chalmers 
(1996).  
 
However, the principle that conceivability entails possibility operates throughout much 
philosophy and is not relevant only to the issue of consciousness. My purpose here is 
neither a detailed study of the use of the Entailment Thesis in philosophy nor a complete 
history of the Thesis. But I’ll mention just a few examples, so to give a taste of its historic 
role in philosophy. The locus classicus of the Entailment Thesis arguably is Descartes’ 
argument in Meditations VI for mind-body dualism. I can clearly and distinctly conceive 
of the mind as separable from the body. And so the mind is a distinct substance from the 
bodythat is to say, something which can exist apart from the body, for separate 
existence is a mark of substantiality. And Hume (1978 [1739-40]: 32) also endorses the 
Entailment Thesis below.  
 
‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly 
conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that 
nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form the idea of a 
golden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may 
actually exist, We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and 
therefore regard it as impossible.  
 
Hume here treats a version of the Entailment Thesis as a metaphysical truth. For 
discussion, see especially Yablo 1993. Notice that Descartes and Hume place constraints 
on what counts as the relevant notion of conception. I will return to this theme.  
Just as we can conceive of some things ourselves, we can imagine other conceivers 
themselves engaged in acts of conception. Indeed, such higher-order or meta-conceptions 
are not entirely uncommon. For example, they play an important role in so-called 
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mindreading or folk psychological simulations, which we use to anticipate other people’s 
mental states, to interpret their actions and to coordinate our shared activities. For 
discussion, see Morton (1980). However, since meta-conceptions are clearly conceptions 
of a certain kind, they raise interesting issues for understanding the imagination. In this 
paper, I’ll focus on Sorensen’s (1996) argument that they pose problems for the 
Entailment Thesis. Sorensen’s argument is not as clear as it might be, and we’ll need to 
reconstruct it charitably.  
 
We’ve called the principle that conceivability entails possibility the Entailment Thesis, so 
let’s call the principle that meta-conceivability entails possibility the Meta-Entailment 
Thesis. I’ll assume that conceiving is a propositional attitude and use ‘p’ and ‘q’ as 
dummy letters for propositions. Then we have: 
 
(Entailment Thesis) If p is conceivable, then p is possible. 
(Meta-Entailment Thesis) If the conceivability of p is itself conceivable, 
then p is possible.  
 
Sorensen argues that the Entailment Thesis implies the Meta-Entailment Thesis. That is,  
If p is possible, provided p is conceivable, then p is possible, provided the conceivability 
of p is itself conceivable.  
 
The proof is straightforward in the presence of a sufficiently rich modal logic. We need 
S4 or a stronger modal logic. That is to say, we require the axiom characteristic of S4, 
traditionally called (4), that what is necessary is necessarily necessary:  
 
(4) If p, then p. 
 
or, equivalently, what is possibly possible is possible:  
 
If p, then p.  
 
Here’s the proof. Assume the Entailment Thesis. So, if p is conceivable, then p is 
possible. And let the conceivability of p be itself conceivable. That is, allow ‘C’ to stand 
for ‘it is conceivable that’, and suppose that the following are true. 
 
1) If Cp then p. 
2) CCp. 
 
We’ll show that p is possible. From (1) and (2), the conceivability of p is possible. In 
other words, 
 
3) Cp. 
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Now, from (1) and (3), Sorensen infers that the possibility of p is possible: 
 
5) p. 
 
It’ll be clear shortly why I’m skipping over a sentence labelled (4). Sorensen (2006, 261) 
glosses these steps from (1) to (5) by writing that “[i]f it is conceivable that it is 
conceivable [that] p, then two applications of the Entailment Thesis entitle us to infer that 
it is possibly possible that p.” Notice, however, that Sorensen’s proof requires that we 
apply the Entailment Thesis within an opaque modal context. So (1) and (3) are 
insufficient to derive (5). However, it’s easy to derive in modal logic the theorem that 
what follows from a possibility is a possibility. That is,  
 
from p→q infer p→q. 
 
And this allows us to make the step from (1) and (3) to (5). Finally, recall, we’re 
assuming that we’re working with a logical system at least as strong as S4, so  
 
4) If p, then p.  
 
From (4) and (5), it follows that p is possible. So  
 
6) p. 
 
So the Entailment Thesis implies the Meta-Entailment Thesis, in the presence of some 
plausible modal theses, such as the axiom equivalent that what is possibly possible is 
possible and the theorem that what follows from a possibility is a possibility. 
I turn to the second premise in Sorensen’s argument. Sorensen holds that we can meta-
conceive of things of which we cannot conceive. For example, I cannot conceive of the 
following: 
 
(First Child) of the first child born in 2100, that he or she will be a doctor.  
(Chiliagon) a chiliagon, a thousand-sided figure.  
 
I cannot imagine that the first child born in 2100 will be a doctor, by entertaining a de re 
proposition, for I am unable presently to pick out the person who satisfies the relevant 
description. And, as Descartes points out in Meditations on First Philosophy VI, 72, I 
cannot imagine a chiliagon with sufficient detail to distinguish it from, say, a myriagon, a 
ten thousand-sided figure.  
 
However, Sorensen holds that we can meta-conceive of such things. I can conceive of 
people in 2100 who, conceiving of the first child born in 2100, entertain the de re 
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proposition that he or she will be a doctor. And I can conceive of a mind with more 
powerful imaginative capacities than myself conceiving of a chiliagon and able to 
distinguish it from a myriagon. So Sorensen alleges that I can conceive of both of the 
following cases: 
 
(2100 People) In 2100 there are people who, conceiving of the first child 
born in 2100, entertain the de re proposition that he or she will be a doctor. 
 
(Supermind) a mind with more powerful imaginative capacities than 
myself conceiving of a chiliagon and able to distinguish it from a 
myriagon. 
 
What is the significance of these meta-conceptions of propositions that I cannot 
conceive? If I can meta-conceive of some possibility which I cannot myself conceive, 
then there are possibilities that are, for me, inconceivable (by a first-order conception). Of 
course, this is a counterexample to the inverse of the entailment thesis: 
 
(inverse entailment thesis) If p is possible, then p is conceivable.  
 
It may well be the case that the possible outstrips our powers of imagination. I will return 
to this aspect of Sorensen’s discussion in §3.  
 
Sorensen’s observation that the Entailment Thesis implies the Meta-Entailment Thesis, 
however, suggests that he is thinking of the following argument. Not only can I meta-
conceive of propositions I cannot conceive, I can also meta-conceive of propositions that 
are impossible. Such cases would be counterexamples to the Meta-Entailment Thesis. 
And, since the Meta-Entailment Thesis is itself entailed by the Entailment Thesis, the 
Entailment Thesis is also false.  
 
I’ll come back soon to the question whether we can meta-conceive impossibilities. First, 
however, I’ll note that Sorensen doesn’t explicitly claim that we can metaconceive 
impossibilities. So I’ll need to defend my interpretation of Sorensen. Instead of explicitly 
claiming that we can metaconceive impossibilities, Sorensen rather makes two different 
claims. And although Sorensen doesn’t make the significance of these claims explicit, I 
believe his comments amount to the claims that we can have a third-order conception of 
an impossibility and that we can conceive impossibilities.  
 
Sorensen’s (2006: 265) first claim is that there is an easy refutation to the Meta-
Entailment Thesis: he writes that, “I can conceive of someone conceiving of a 
counterexample. That should be sufficient refutation for someone who subscribes to ‘The 
conceivability of conceivability implies possibility’.” If I understand this passage, 
Sorensen is claiming that I can have a third-order conception of an impossibility: I can 
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conceive of someone conceiving of someone conceiving impossibilities. Since this begs 
the question at hand, it would be best to pass over Sorensen’s first claim.  
 
I turn to Sorensen’s second claim. Sorensen holds that I can meta-conceive of a 
proposition, which I cannot myself conceive, being conceived because I can meta-
conceive of a proposition being conceived without thereby conceiving of that proposition 
myself. When I meta-conceive, I need only entertain the higher order conception; I do not 
need to entertain the lower order conception. So Sorensen doesn’t explicitly claim that I 
can meta-conceive impossibilities. Rather, he holds that my meta-conceptions do not 
need to satisfy the requirements for successful conceptions with respect to the lower-
order conception; they only need to satisfy the requirements for successful conceptions 
with respect to the higher-order conception. Meta-conceptions show, according to 
Sorensen, that conceptions need not be held to the strict requirements those who endorse 
the Entailment Thesis might have expected.  
 
However, Sorensen (2006: 270) writes that “[s]ince the meta-entailment (CCp→p) is 
less plausible than the entailment (Cp→p), we must either raise our opinion of the 
meta-entailment or lower our opinion of the Entailment Thesis. The downward revision 
seems more natural.” I fail to understand Sorensen’s discussion, unless he holds that we 
can meta-conceive impossibilities. That meta-conceptions might offer a counter-example 
to the inverse entailment thesis is irrelevant to his conclusion. So I ascribe to Sorensen 
the following argument: 
 
(7) the Entailment Thesis (what is conceivable is possible) entails the 
Meta-entailment Thesis (what is conceivably conceivable is possible); 
 
(8) we can meta-conceive impossibilities, so the Meta-entailment Thesis is 
false; 
 
so (9) the Entailment Thesis is false.  
 
Nichols (2007: 14) appears also to take Sorensen to be offering this argument. At any 
rate, the argument is of independent interest, regardless of Sorensen’s intentions, and I 
will consider all of the following claims: we can meta-conceive impossibilities; we can 
meta-conceive possibilities which we cannot conceive; and I can meta-conceive of a 
proposition being conceived without thereby conceiving of that proposition myself.  
 
 
2 
 
Sorensen, we have seen, holds that I can meta-conceive of a proposition, which I cannot 
myself conceive, being conceived because I can meta-conceive of a proposition being 
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conceived without thereby conceiving of that proposition myself. I have noted that this 
claim is of little relevance to the Entailment Thesis unless Sorensen holds that I can even 
meta-conceive of impossibilities. However, in this section, I first will assess Sorensen’s 
reasons for holding that I can meta-conceive of a proposition being conceived without 
thereby conceiving of that proposition myself.  
 
Sorensen’s argument concerns whether iterated conceptions collapse into conceptions. 
The issue is this. Let us say that the conception of a conception collapses into a 
conception, when my conceiving of a proposition being conceived entails that I conceive 
of that proposition. And more generally, were the conception of a conception to collapse 
into a conception, then the conceivability of a proposition being conceived would entail 
that that proposition is itself conceivable. Since this line of reasoning is repeatable, 
collapsability might well be taken as a claim about n-ary iterated conceptions, where in 
principle any number can be substituted for ‘n’. So let us label the principle at hand as 
follows:  
 
(collapsing conception thesis) Cnp→Cp  
 
where ‘Cnp’ stands for the n-ary iterated conception, p is conceivably conceivably … 
conceivable. Sorensen argues for the falsity of the collapsing conception thesis. And it is 
for this reason, the falsity of the collapsing conception thesis, that I can meta-conceive of 
a proposition being conceived without thereby conceiving of that proposition myself. 
Indeed, the conceivability of a proposition being conceived does not entail that that 
proposition is itself even conceivable.  
 
In this section of the paper, I will note that Sorensen’s argument for the falsity of the 
collapsing conception thesis fails to persuade. Then, in the next section, I will offer 
reasons instead to support the collapsing conception thesis.  
 
Sorensen’s argument draws on an alleged analogy between conception and perception. 
Sorensen holds that an iterated perception does not entail the embedded perception. That 
is to say, to use the terminology introduced above, the perceivability of a perception does 
not collapse into a first-order perception. As in the case of collapsing conceptions, the 
situation generalizes to n-ary iterated perceptions. Let us label the principle, analogous to 
the collapsing conception thesis, as follows:  
 
(collapsing perception thesis) Pnp→Pp  
 
where ‘Pnp’ stands for the n-ary iterated perception, p is perceivably perceivably … 
perceivable. Sorensen defends the denial of the collapsing perception thesis by appeal to 
several kinds of cases.  
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According to one kind of case, chains of perception may be broken by interposed agents. 
Sorensen considers a case mentioned by Sanford (2004).  
 
(mimic) You are attending lecture in a large lecture hall, and you cannot yourself hear the 
lecturer. However, sitting next to you is a talented mimic with better hearing. The mimic 
repeats the lecture with great fidelity, including the vocal mannerisms of the lecturer.   
 
Sanford and Sorensen claim that in mimic you do not hear the lecture. If Sanson and 
Sorensen are correct, then this case would provide a counter-example to the collapsing 
perception thesis.  
 
At the risk of pedantry, let’s lay out Sorensen’s argument. For Sorensen’s discussion is 
not as clear as it might be and an explicit statement of the argument will facilitate 
assessment. Sorensen’s argument appears to be the following: 
 
(10) the collapsing perception thesis entails the collapsing conception 
thesis;  
 
(11) the collapsing perception thesis is false; 
 
So (12) the collapsing conception thesis is false.  
 
I’ll discuss each premise in turn. 
 
Sorensen’s sole explicit support for (10) is his (2006: 262) undefended claim that 
conception is analogous with perception. It is difficult to assess this claim. Like a 
perception, a conception is a conscious state of an agent. And arguably, both perceptions 
and conceptions have propositional content. However, these are features that conceptions 
share with any propositional attitude. Conceiving and perceiving are both sources of 
knowledge. But certain other sources of knowledge can form chains that are not broken 
by interposed agents. Reliable testimony, for example, is transitive. So are perceptions 
and conceptions analogous in any stronger sense? In particular, are conceptions and 
perceptions analogous phenomenologically? Conscious episodes such as perceptions are 
arguably individuated phenomenologically. A pain, for example, just is a certain feeling. 
It is for this reason that physical, behavioural or functional characterizations of pain fail 
to identify the phenomenon. So were conceptions and perceptions analogous 
phenomenologically, they would be very strongly analogous. And we might well expect 
such parallel features as that implied by (10). 
 
Conceptions may involve imagined quasi-perceptive experiences. When you considered 
mimic, you may have entertained attendent visualisations of sitting in a lecture hall, 
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listening to the mimic, and so on. Such conceptions are arguably phenomenologically 
similar to perception.  
 
However, not all examples of conceptions are like this. This is, I believe, well accepted 
within the field. George Bealer, for example, is a strong supporter of the role of intuitions 
and conceptions in philosophy. However, even Bealer denies that intuitions are always 
accompanied by imagery or perceptive content. Some of the cases that Bealer considers 
treat intuitions as dispositions to assent to claims without attendent perceptions or quasi-
perceptive experiences. For example, he (1996: 123) discusses one of de Morgan’s Laws 
seeming true as a conscious episode but one lacking perceptual content. We have hitherto 
been discussing somewhat different kinds of cases. But Sorensen holds that cases such as 
2100 People and Supermind are conceivable. And in these cases, it seems we might 
entertain such scenarios without any attendent perception. Indeed, I believe that I can 
entertain mimic without any attendent perception.  
 
Of course, even if we concede that conceptions are analogous to perception 
phenomenologically, this would not show that the two cognitive states are analogous in a 
way relevant to supporting (10). At any rate, it is uncontroversial that there are certain 
analogies and certain disanalogies between conception and perception. The question at 
hand is whether the two are analogous with respect to collapsability. Sorensen is perhaps 
thinking along the following lines. One does not first need to establish that there are 
certain analogies between conception and perception. The mere fact that there are 
analogies would show little. But if the reader agrees that the collapsing perception thesis 
is false, she will on reflection and for similar considerations, agree that the collapsing 
conception thesis is false as well. After all, only this would show that conception and 
perception are relevantly analogous. Although this line of argumentation is not entirely 
persuasive, let us concede the point. Sorensen’s argument hinges then on the premise (11) 
and I will next consider its truth.  
 
Sorensen defends (11) with cases such as mimic. His assessment of these cases, however, 
rests on an equivocation. Recall, in this case, I attend a lecture where the lecturer is 
inaudible to me but I listen to a talented mimic’s simultaneous recitation. Sanford and 
Sorensen allege that I do not hear the lecture, since I hear only the mimic’s version. 
However, the claim that I hear the lecture is ambiguous. Although I do not hear the token 
event of the original lecturer’s lecture, there is another sense in which I do indeed hear 
the lecture. For I hear a performance of the lecture, not the original lecturer’s lecture but 
the distinct token event of the mimic’s recitation. Likewise, the collapsing perception 
thesis is ambiguous. Ought we to take the conception in the consequent as the token 
occurance of the embedded perception in the higher-order conception or instead as the 
latter’s perceived content?  
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Perhaps however I have offered in (10)-(12) an uncharitable reading of Sorensen’s 
argument. We might weaken (11) so to give a better argument which is nonetheless a not 
implausible interpretation of Sorensen’s intentions. Let us consider next Sorensen’s other 
cases offered in support of the claim that higher-order perceptions do not collapse. 
Although in mimic, the agent of the higher-order perception is not the agent of the lower-
order perception, in other of Sorensen’s cases the higher- and lower-order perceptions 
have the same agent. Some of these are cross-modal, where the higher- and lower-order 
perceptions are of different kinds. For example, I cannot see by hearing. I cannot hear the 
lecture by reading the transcript of the lecture, projected simultaneously with the lecture 
as surtitles. Likewise, I may well hear that I see the lecture. For example, as I watch some 
activity on the stage of a lecture hall, a person next to me may whisper in my ear, and tell 
me that I indeed am watching a lecture. However, I do not thereby see the lecture. For it 
is not in virtue of being told that the activity I am watching is a lecture, that I am seeing 
the lecture.  
 
In a third and final kind of case the higher- and lower-order perceptions have the same 
agents and are of the same perceptual modality. Suppose that with my right hand I am 
feeling around in my pants pocket for coins. I also with my left hand feel my right hand. 
Yet, Sorensen (2006: 263) claims, that higher-order feeling is not itself a feeling around 
for coins. That is, by feeling myself feeling around for coins, I do not thereby feel around 
for coins. To give a last example, I may remember remembering some event without 
thereby remembering that event.  
 
Notice that these cases make it clear that Sorensen appears to want to deny something 
weaker than the collapsing perception thesis. For in these cases, the entailment in 
collapsing perception thesis does indeed obtain. I do in fact feel around for coins in my 
pocket; otherwise, I could not feel myself feeling around for coins. I did in fact remember 
the event; otherwise, I could not now remember remembering it. Rather, Sorensen wants 
to deny that, in entertaining a higher-order perception, I thereby entertain the embedded 
lower-order perception. And moreover Sorensen denies that, in entertaining a higher-
order conception, I thereby entertain the embedded lower-order conception. In the next 
section of the paper, I will defend just this claim.  
 
 
3 
 
Few would claim that any imaginative act whatsoever has modal consequences. Rather, 
modal epistemologists have typically imposed constraints on the imagination to 
distinguish legitimate conceptions which, they go on to allege, have modal consequences, 
from other imaginative acts which do not. I’ll continue to use ‘conception’ for the 
constrained imaginative acts, and occasionally modify these as ‘possibility-guiding’ to 
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emphasize their difference from other imaginative acts which some (Sorensen included) 
have called conceptions.  
 
The modal consequences are then not intended to flow from the imaginative act alone. 
Certainly, this would be an inexplicable human power, if I were able to get onto 
necessary truths by the sheer fact that I am imagining itas if I were able, solely by the 
force of my mind, determine what is possible. An immodest claim and one which, to my 
knowledge, no one makes. Of course, one might hold that our imaginative abilities track 
modal truthsclaiming for example an evolutionary explanationwithout holding that 
my imagination is the cause of modal truths in the world. But few ascribe even this 
power of tracking possibilities to the human imagination. Rather, the modal 
consequences flow in part from the constraints imposed on my imaginative acts. In this 
section of the paper, I will rehearse a few representatives of the constraints which 
philosophers have proposed. My goal is not to provide a comprehensive survey. Rather, I 
hope to bring out that, regardless of what condition we place on conceptions, similar 
conditions are applicable to meta-conceptions. 
 
In Descartes’ view, it seems, it is the clarity and distinctness of my imagination which 
ensures that what I imagine is possible, and not the mere fact that I am imagining what I 
imagine. So possibility guidance then requires that the content of the conception be 
neither obscure nor confused. Recall that Descartes takes Chiliagon to be confused. For I 
cannot conceive of a thousand-sided closed figure with sufficient detail to distinguish the 
conception from the conception of a myriagon, a ten-thousand sided figure. I doubt that 
Chiliagon is confused in this way. Descartes, I believe, ties conception too closely to 
quasi-perceptual phenomenology. If I mentally visualize a chiliagon, I picture a closed 
figure with a great many sides, one which from a distance is indistinguishable from a 
circle. When I mentally visualize a myriagon, I entertain the same mental picture. As I 
have noted above, conceptions need not involve any such attendent perceptual or quasi-
perceptual experiences. So I disagree with Descartes that the criterion of clarity and 
distinctness preclude Chiliagon from being possibility guiding. However, certain 
imaginative acts may well have obscure or confused content. For example, the mental 
visualization of a chiliagon is indeed confused. And for this reason, the visualization is 
not possibility guiding. So clarity and distinctness may be a mark of possibility guidance 
in certain cases.  
 
If clarity and distinctness is a mark of possibility guidance for certain first-order 
conceptions, then surely clarity and distinctness is a mark of possibility guidance for 
higher order conceptions of these conceptions. To bring out this point, let us concede that 
Chiliagon is confused. Then surely my meta-conception Supermind suffers from the very 
same confusion. For suppose that I cannot conceive of Chiliagon because, when I attempt 
to visualize a chiliagon, the mental picture I entertain is indistinguishable from the mental 
picture I entertain when I attempt to visualize a myriagon. What then do I imagine when I 
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entertain Supermind? My conception of a superior mind conceiving of a chiliagon is 
phenomenologically indistinguishable from my conception of a superior mind conceiving 
of a myriagon. To be clear, I do not endorse clarity and distinctness as good criteria for 
possibility guidance, and I do not endorse the view that conceptions are 
phenomenologically like perceptions. But I do believe that, if we were to hold these 
views, then we ought to apply these views equally to lower- and higher-order 
conceptions.  
 
A more popular proposal for a mark of possibility guidance is freedom from a charge of 
mis-description. Consider the following alleged conception: 
 
(queen) Queen Elizabeth II is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Truman.  
 
For queen, see Kripke (1980: 112), who takes queen to be necessarily false. Given that 
Queen Elizabeth II is not the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Truman, the thesis of the necessity 
of origins ensures that it is necessary the case that Queen Elizabeth II is the daughter of 
the Trumans. Yet it seems that we can entertain the impossibility. A common response to 
is the following. queen is mis-described. I am not entertaining the thought that Queen 
Elizabeth II is herself the daughter of the Trumans. Rather, I am entertaining the thought 
that someone who closely resembles Queen Elizabeth II is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. 
Truman. This thought is merely contingently false.  
 
Now consider the meta-conception corresponding to queen:  
 
(queen conceived) A conceiver conceives of Queen Elizabeth II being the 
daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Truman.  
 
One might hold that queen conceived is conceivable. If it were, then queen conceived 
would provide a legitimate counterexample to the meta-entailment thesis. However, it 
seems to me that one ought to respond to the allegation that queen conceived is a 
legitimate or possibility-guiding conception in just the same way as the response to the 
allegation that queen is a possibility-guiding conception. What specifically am I 
conceiving when I allegedly imagine queen conceived, the meta-conception that the 
Queen was born to parents different from her actual parents? In allegedly conceiving 
queen, I am really entertaining the possibility that someone, not the Queen but who 
satisfies many of the descriptions which she herself satifies in virtue of her contingent 
properties, is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Truman. It seems to me that, if queen 
conceived has much real content at all, it is that I am imagining someone entertaining the 
possibility that someone, not the Queen but who satisfies many of the descriptions which 
she herself satifies in virtue of her contingent properties, is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. 
Truman. Surely I can’t be imagining someone entertaining the possibility that the Queen 
herself was born to parents different from her actual parents.  
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My conjecture is that a meta-conception is possibility-guiding only if the embedded 
conception is possibility-guiding as well. So, for example, suppose that clarity and 
distinctness are necessary conditions for possibility guidance. Then, when I conceive that 
something is conceived, that higher-order conception is possibility-guiding only if both 
my conception of the conception and that conception itself are clear and distinct. Suppose 
instead that immunity to charges of misdescription are necessary conditions for 
possibility guidance. Then, likewise, when I conceive that something is conceived, that 
higher-order conception is possibility-guiding only if both my conception of the 
conception and that conception itself are free of misdescription.  
 
I turn to an alternative interpretation of Sorensen’s intentions. Recall that Sorensen holds 
that meta-conceptions do not collapse into conceptions. In meta-conceiving some 
proposition, I do not thereby conceive of that conception. Indeed, I can meta-conceive of 
some possibility which I cannot myself conceive, so there are possibilities that are 
inconceivable (by a first-order conception). That is to say, Sorensen might intend to offer 
a counter-example to inverse entailment thesis. It may well be the case that the possible 
outstrips our powers of imagination. I doubt however that considerations concerning 
meta-conceptions would establish this. The same considerations as with meta-conceiving 
impossibilities apply. For the same constraints applicable to first-order conceptions, 
whatever they may be—immunity from charges of obscurity, confusion, mis-description 
or some other condition a conception must meet so to be possibility-guiding—are prima 
facie applicable to higher-order conceptions.  
 
Let me note that there is room for considerable agreement with Sorensen. First, I have 
conjectured that the collapsing conception thesis is true for suitably constrained 
conceptions, and Sorensen might well agree. Second, I have advocated the stronger claim 
that, in meta-conceiving some proposition, I thereby conceive of that proposition—again, 
for suitably constrained conceptions and, with that proviso, Sorensen might well agree. 
Finally, I have mooted the worry that conceptions are not good guides to possibility, 
since it may be difficult to ascertain when any proposed constraints are met. And again, 
Sorensen might well agree.  
 
There are however significant points of disagreement. Of most significance, I have 
argued that, whatever the constraints placed on conceptions, so to ensure that they be 
possibility-guiding, they apply equally to first-order and higher-order conceptions. 
Although there may be difficulties in recognizing that meta-conceptions are suitably 
constrained, it is not obvious that the difficulties are different in kind or degree from the 
difficulties in recognizing that conceptions are suitably constrained.  
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Conclusion 
 
I conjecture that possibility-guiding meta-conceptions collapse into conceptions. That is 
to say, if I meta-conceive a conceiver entertaining a first-order conception, and that 
higher-order conception carries consequences for what is possible, then I thereby 
conceive of that first order conception myself. This claim has the status of a conjecture 
because I haven’t provided necessary and sufficient conditions for an imaginative act to 
be a possibility-guiding conception. However, the descriptive problems identified in the 
previous section make it plausible that a necessary condition for an imaginative act to be 
a possibility-guiding meta-conception is that the embedded first-order conception be 
neither obscure nor confused nor falsely described by the meta-conceiver. And more 
generally, suppose that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for an imaginative 
act to be a possibility-guiding conception. Then whatever these conditions are, the 
considerations from the previous section suggest that conceptions satisfying these 
conditions collapse.   
 
I conjecture then that possibility guiding conceptions adhere to a principle analogous to 
the modal axiom characteristic of S4 which, recall, is: 
 
4) If p, then p.  
 
That is to say, possibility-guiding conceptions adhere to the collapsing conception thesis. 
Indeed, I hold a stronger claim. Not only does a possibility-guiding meta-conception 
entail a certain possibility-guiding conception. In entertaining a possibility-guiding meta-
conception, I thereby entertain a certain possibility-guiding conception. But the weaker 
claim, and the resulting analogy with (4), is instructive. For equivalent to (4) is the 
transitivity of the accessibility relation among possible worlds. And so the analogy 
suggests that the accessibility relation among worlds that are both conceivable and 
possibility-guiding is transitive. Such transitivity is a mark of possibility entailment.  
 
I don’t however claim that conceivability guides possibility, and this for several reasons. 
First, for all we have seen, it may not be possible to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for legitimate possibility-guiding conceptions which adequately distinguish 
such conceptions from other imaginative acts. Second, conceptions and obscure, 
confused or falsely described imaginary scenarios may be very difficult to distinguish 
phenomenologically, if such imaginative acts have any phenomenological character at all. 
If this is the case, then even if we can in principle distinguish conceptions from other 
imaginative acts it may prove difficult to know when the conditions for an imaginative 
act to be a conception obtain. Finally, successful acts of conception may rely on our 
possession and application of substantive modal beliefs. If this is the case, then even if 
we can effectively distinguish conceptions from other imaginative acts, conceptions will 
not be able to provide an independent or non-modal guide to possibility and necessity.  
Essays Philos (2012) 13:1                                                                                                    Corkum | 210 
 
 
 
 
I’ll close with a brief final remark. Philosophical or meta-philosophical reflection often 
itself employs meta-conceptions. We discuss the philosophical methodology of 
entertaining imaginative scenarios at one step removed. The employment of such 
conceptions within philosophical argumentation, we have seen, requires care. If I am 
right that the relevant notion of conception collapses, then such reflection on 
philosophical methodology itself requires equal care.  
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